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Introduction
 Debra and Michael Johnson live with their two young children 
in a small two-bedroom house in the suburbs.  Debra teaches first grade 
at the elementary school, and, until recently, Michael worked fifty hours 
a week as an electrician.  They are of modest means and live a modest 
lifestyle.  They had been getting by living paycheck-to-paycheck until 
Michael lost his job when his company downsized.  Michael applied for 
job after job, but to no avail.  The economy was tough and no one was 
hiring.
 With Debra now the family’s sole wage earner, the Johnsons are 
no longer able to pay their bills.  They charged the gas and electric bills 
to their credit card just to keep their heat and electricity on.  Next it was 
the groceries.  That was the last charge they made to their credit card.  
Although they had always paid their bills on time in the past, they had to 
skip their $50 minimum payment on the credit card this month.  They 
were getting close to their $2,500.00 credit limit.
 The next month when they received the credit card bill, the new 
balance due included fifty dollars1 for the minimum due from the month 
before, fifty dollars for this month’s minimum payment, and a forty 
dollar late charge.  Again, the Johnsons could not afford to pay the credit 
card bill.  The next bill came with another forty dollar late fee.  Only this 
time, the new late fee put the Johnsons over their credit limit, and there 
was a forty dollar over-limit fee in addition to the other fees.  Their new 
1  Most credit card companies require a minimum payment each month of two 
percent of the total balance.  $50 would be the minimum due on a $2,500.00 balance.
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balance due was $270.
 Finally, after eight weeks and two missed credit card payments, 
Michael found a new job.  The Johnsons did their best to catch up on all 
their bills by paying what they could.  This month, the Johnsons paid $70 
on their credit card—the most they could afford—bringing the balance 
due down to $200.  However, due to the late and over-limit fees that 
had been assessed, the Johnsons were still above their credit limit.  The 
credit card company also sent the Johnsons a letter saying that since 
the family had been late on two consecutive credit card payments, their 
interest rates were being raised from 7 percent to the “Default Rate” of 30 
percent, which would apply not only to new purchases, but to purchases 
the Johnsons had already made.
 The next month, they received another forty dollar late fee and 
another forty dollar over-limit fee, in addition to their minimum monthly 
payment of fifty dollars.  Now their balance due was $330.  The Johnsons 
continued to pay as much as they could each month, but did not get 
caught up on the payments for another three months.  By the time the 
Johnsons got caught up on their minimum payments, they had paid over 
$440 in fees to the credit card company, in addition to the 30 percent 
interest rate.  
 According to Robert Hammer, chairman of industry consultant 
R.K. Hammer, “Issuers will reap a record $20.5 billion in penalty 
fees in 2009.”2  These fees are essentially contract penalties and 
not compensatory in nature; this results in a windfall to credit card 
companies.3  As contract penalties have long been held violative of public 
policy, credit card late and over-limit fees should be abolished.  Current 
legislation is impotent at protecting consumer rights.
 This article begins by discussing usury laws and the historic 
disdain for contract penalties.  Part II of this article explains and 
contrasts liquidated damages and contract penalties.  Part III explains 
why credit card late and over-limit fees are penalties rather than 
2  Kathy Chu, U.S.A. Today, Bank Credit Card Fees Keep Going Up, March 15, 
2009, available at: http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/credit/2009-03-15-bank-
credit-card-fees_N.htm?csp=34.
3  Kathleen Day and Caroline E. Mayer, Credit Card Penalties, Fees Bury Debtors;  
Senate Nears Action On Bankruptcy Curbs, Washington Post, March 6, 2005, at A01.
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liquidated damages.  Finally, Part IV discusses remedial measures that 
must be taken to prevent credit card companies from reaping windfall 
profits through penalty fees. I argue that credit card late and over-
limit fees are not liquidated damages, but contracted-for penalties that 
result in unjustified windfall profits to credit card companies which 
are obtained through contracts of adhesion and should not be enforced 
because they are illegal under common law and against public policy.
I. History
 American jurisprudence’s disdain for contract penalties can 
be traced back to penal bonds in England, which emerged in the late 
thirteenth century.  In order to secure performance under a contract, 
a promisee would exact from the promisor a sealed instrument which 
promised to pay a certain sum, on the condition that the obligation 
to pay would be void upon the promisor’s satisfactory completion of 
performance.4   The stipulated penalty for non-performance could be 
any amount agreed upon by the parties, even if it exceeded the value of 
the act or forbearance stipulated.5    For centuries, English common law 
courts “enforced such bonds literally and, if the promisor had not strictly 
performed as required by the contract, would give judgment against the 
promisor for the sum fixed in the bond, regardless of the amount of loss 
caused by the promisee by the breach.”6   Although some courts were 
sympathetic to the debtor, the prevailing attitude was that one must be 
held to the letter of his contracts.7  
 Penal bonds originally became popular in England as an 
alternative to charging interest on loans, which was considered usury, 
and therefore unlawful for Christians.8  In such transactions, the debtor’s 
bond would state that he would pay the creditor ten dollars (or whatever 
currency was in use at the time) on a certain day, or eighteen dollars if 
he were to pay after that day.9  Since usury was illegal, and could be used 
by debtors as a defense to the obligation, courts attempted to distinguish 
4  E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts §12.18 at 812 (4th ed. 2004); 
5  William H. Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 117 (1915).
6  Farnsworth, supra note 4 at 812.
7  Loyd, supra note 5 at 118, 120.
8   Id. at 117, 119.
9   Id. at 120.
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between “agreements where the penalty was truly conditional, where the 
borrower could wholly discharge himself by repayment within a given 
time, and where the written condition was but a subterfuge, and the real 
intent of the parties was that the loan should not be repaid without the 
added sum. . . .”10  The former agreements, where the bond was merely 
collateral, were generally legal, whereas the latter were considered 
unlawful usury.11
 It was not until the seventeenth century that courts began to 
chip away at the stronghold of contract penalties by relieving penalties 
incurred through the “minor negligence” of an obligor.12  Still, progress 
was slow.  
 Although plaintiffs were no longer able to recover in excess of 
actual damages, defendants still had to suffer judgment in the courts of 
chancery before they could get their relief at equity.13  This inconvenience 
was later remedied with statutes having the effect of consolidating the 
actions.14  The modern law, adopted by the United States, prohibits 
recovery in excess of actual damages (including interest) for both penal 
bonds and contracts in general.15  
II. Liquidated Damages vs. Penalties
 It has become commonplace for sophisticated parties to include 
terms in their contracts providing that if the promisor fails to perform 
as agreed under the contract, he must pay a predetermined sum to the 
promisee.16  Since no damages have yet occurred at the time of contract 
formation, these stipulated sums are often speculative at best.  Such 
provisions are only valid if the sum payable upon breach is meant to 
approximate the actual damages the promisee would suffer.  Courts will 
not enforce stipulated damage provisions that function as penalties, even 
10  Id. at 121.
11  Id. 
12  Id. at 125
13  4 and 5 Anne, c. 16 §§ 12, 13.
14  8 and 9 William III, c. 11 § 8.
15  Sun Ridge Investors, Ltd. v. Parker, 956 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1998); Flores v. 
Millenium Interests, Ltd., 185 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2005); Raffel v. Medallion Kitchens of 
Minn., Inc., 1996 WL 675787 (N.D. Ill. 1996); see also James P. George, Reimposable 
Discounts and Medieval Contract Penalties, 20 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 50, 61 (2007).
16  Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Management Consultants, Inc., 690 
P.2d 207 (Colo. 1984).
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if the parties have both willingly agreed to such a term.17  “While freedom 
to contract lies at the core of contract law, freedom of contract does not 
embrace the freedom to punish, even by contract.”18  Thus, public policy 
demands that the stipulated damages be compensatory in nature, rather 
than punitive.19  
 The purpose of contract remedies is to compensate the non-
breaching party for any loss she incurs as a direct result of the breach, 
and to put her in the place she would have been had the breach not 
occurred. 20 Contract remedies are not designed to punish a party who 
fails to perform under a contract.21  Professor Allan Farnsworth explains, 
“[It] is a fundamental tenet of the law of contract remedies that an 
injured party should not be put in a better position than had the contract 
been performed.”22  Thus, well-established common law dictates that 
contracted-for penalties are unenforceable because they are against 
public policy.23  
 This judicially-imposed safeguard prevents parties with superior 
bargaining power from contracting for their own unjust enrichment.  
It is unlikely that a person in an arm’s length negotiation with a party 
of roughly equal bargaining power would consent to a penalty against 
himself.  By refusing to enforce terms that no reasonable person would 
intentionally bargain for, the courts help protect consumers from abusive 
contract terms imposed on them by parties with grossly disproportionate 
bargaining power.24 
17  Canadian Mining Co. v. Creekmore, 295 S.W.2d 357 (1956).
18  DAR & Associates, Inc. v. Uniforce Services, Inc.  37 F.Supp.2d 192, 
200 (E.D.N.Y., 1999).
19  Monsanto Co. v. McFarling  363 F.3d 1336, 1345 (C.A. Fed. (Mo.),2004)
20  Restatement Second of Contracts § 356, comment (a).
21  Farnsworth, supra note 4 at 760.
22  Id.
23  Graves v. Cupic, 272 P.2d 1020 (Idaho 1954), Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 
785 (Tex. 1991), Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co. 220 A.2d 263, 266-67 
(Conn. 1966.), Lake Ridge Academy v. Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ohio 1993), Milton 
Const. Co., Inc. v. State Highway Dept., 568 So.2d 784, 789 (Ala. 1990), Guiliano v. Cleo, 
Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 101 (Tenn. 1999), Leonard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 
425, 431 (Minn. App. 2000).
24  Courts often take into consideration the relative bargaining power of the parties 
when determining whether a clause is for a penalty or liquidated damages.  See Pacificorp 
Capital, Inc. v. Tano, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“parties bargaining power 
is a factor when determining if one side is exacting an unconscionable penalty”(quoting 
Rattigan v. Commodore Intern. Ltd., 739 F.Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y.1990))).
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 Contract penalties are also offensive to public policy because 
they are meant to coerce the promisor into performance through an in 
terrorem effect.25  When the amount to be paid by the breaching party 
is clearly in excess of any actual damages the promisee would suffer, 
the purpose of the clause is to secure performance by compulsion, not 
compensate the injured party.26  Judge Jasen of the New York  Court 
of Appeals – illuminating the effects of penalty clauses – explains,  “A 
promisor would be compelled, out of fear of economic devastation, to 
continue performance and his promisee, in the event of default, would 
reap a windfall well above actual harm sustained.”27  
 Although courts generally do not allow promisees to recover 
windfall damages through penalty clauses, courts do enforce liquidated 
damages clauses which are structured to estimate a party’s actual loss in 
the event of a breach.28  To be considered a liquidated damages clause 
rather than a penalty, the clause must meet three conditions:
 1) the amount stipulated must be a reasonable one, that is to say, 
not greatly disproportionate to the presumed loss or injury;
 2) the damages to be anticipated as resulting from the breach 
must be uncertain in amount or difficult to prove; and 
 3) there must have been an intent on the part of the parties to 
liquidate them in advance.29
 To be valid, the liquidated damages clause must be a reasonable 
estimate of forecasted damages when the contract is made, and does 
not necessarily have to equal actual damages at the time of breach.30   
When distinguishing between liquidated damages and penalties, Judge 
Posner stated, “If damages would be easy to determine [at the time 
of contracting], or if the estimate greatly exceeds a reasonable upper 
25  Pacheco v. Scoblionko, 532 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Me. 1987), S.L. Rowland Const. Co. 
v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 540 P.2d 912, 921 (Wash.App. 1975), Truck Rent-A-Center v. 
Puritan Farms 2nd, 361 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (N.Y. 1977).
26  Truck Rent-A-Center, 361 N.E.2d at 1018.
27  Id.
28  Days Inn Worldwide v. Mandir, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1240, 49 (W.D. Okla.  2005), 
Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Show-Me Power, 157 F.Supp. 681, 83 (D.C. Mo. 1957). 
29  Stamford v. Banta, 92 A. 665, 667 (Conn. 1914).
30  Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289-90 (C.A.7 
(Ill.),1985).
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estimate of what the damages are likely to be, it is a penalty.”31
 Since most sophisticated contracts are drafted by intelligent 
lawyers who know that only liquidated damages are enforceable, the label 
put on the sum to be paid is often irrelevant.32  One must usually look 
to the specific facts of the agreement to determine whether the clause is 
meant to approximate actual damages or as a punitive fee designed to 
unjustly enrich the promisee.33  When a liquidated damages clause “is 
intended to operate as a means to compel performance, it will be deemed 
a penalty and will not be enforced.”34
 If a damages provision is designed to put the non-breaching 
party in the place he would have been had the contract terms been 
fulfilled, the parties must anticipate actual damages in the event of a 
breach.35  To be enforceable, the agreed amount must bear a reasonable 
relationship to the forecasted damages.36  If the non-breaching party 
would not suffer any actual damages under a breach, then any stipulated 
sum to be paid by the breaching party would not be compensatory; if 
there is no loss, there is nothing to be compensated for.  If the damages 
provision is non-compensatory, it is a punitive damages provision that is 
unenforceable under the common law on public policy grounds.37  
31  Id.
32  Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 65:11 (2008).
33  Contracted for liquidated damages “may be and often are held to provide for 
a penalty.”  Graves v. Cupic, 272 P.2d 1020 (Idaho 1954) (Supreme Court of Idaho found 
the stipulated damages to be unconscionable, exorbitant, arbitrary, and lacking of any 
“reasonable relation to the damages which the parties could have anticipated from the 
breach . . . .” where a tavern owner attempted to retain $14,500 in partial payments – 
toward the $50,000 purchase price – as liquidated damages when the buyer could not 
complete the transaction); Philips v. Philips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. 1991) (Supreme 
Court of Texas rejected the provision of a partnership agreement setting liquidated damages 
as ten times the actual damages incurred by a breach of trust.); Lake Ridge Academy v. 
Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 188-191 (Ohio 1993) (Supreme Court of Ohio permitted liquidated 
damages provision in a private school reservation agreement providing that repudiation by 
a child’s parent after an August 1 deadline would result in liability for the full year’s tuition 
amount because 1) the school would be “unable to calculate and prove the precise damages 
caused by the loss of one student’s tuition,” 2) the contract, taken as a whole, was not “so 
manifestly unconscionable, unreasonable, and disproportionate in amount as to justify 
the conclusion that it does not express the true intention of the parties,” 3) the contract, 
taken as a whole, was not unconscionable, 4) the contract, taken as a whole, was not 
unreasonable, and 5) damages were not disproportionate to actual damages).  
34  Brecher v. Laikin, 430 F. Supp. 103, 106 (S.D. N.Y. 1977).
35  Southern Roofing & Petroleum Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 293 F.Supp. 725, 
731 (D.C.Tenn. 1968), In re Dow Corning Corp., 419 F.3d 543, 549-50 (C.A.6 (Mich.),2005).
36  Johnson v. Jones, 33 Ark.App. 149, 152, 807 S.W.2d 39, 41 (1991).
37  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (1981) Comment a and b.  (“The parties 
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III. Why Credit Card Late Fees are Penalties rather than 
Liquidated Damages
A. Credit Card Agreements are Contracts of Adhesion under which 
Cardholders Have No Meaningful Opportunity to Bargain for Terms.
 In the United States, credit card companies make the decision 
of whether to extend offers of credit based on a person’s FICO score – 
potentially ranging from 150 to 950 – which is mathematically derived 
from “payment history, amounts owed, types of credit used, new credit 
and length of credit history,” all contained in one’s credit report.38  Credit 
card companies calculate the interest rate they will offer to the consumer 
based on the level of risk the consumer poses as a borrower.39  
 These “offers” are contracts of adhesion, offered on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis, in which the consumer has no ability to bargain for 
individual terms.40  The majority of credit card offers are sent via direct 
mail solicitations.41  These solicitations generally include an application 
for credit or a notice of “pre-approval” and a mere summary of the terms 
of the cardholder agreement, rather than a copy of the agreement in 
its entirety.42  The agreement itself is presented to the consumer as a 
standardized printed form with numerous pages of small font type.43  The 
consumer has no opportunity to negotiate with the credit card company 
on an individual basis.44  Resounding evidence of the adhesiveness 
of credit card terms can be found in the findings of a nationally 
representative poll of more than 1,000 adults conducted by the Opinion 
to a contract may effectively provide in advance the damages that are to be payable in the 
event of breach as long as the provision does not disregard the principle of compensation.  
* * * Punishment of a promisor for having broken his promise has no justification on 
either economic or other grounds and a term providing such a penalty is unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy.”  Id. at Comment a.  (Emphasis added.) 
38  Jessica Dickler, Settling the Credit Score, CnnMoney.com, August 6, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/06/pf/credit_score_availability/index.htm.
39  Id.
40  Homa v. American Express Co., 2009 WL 440912, 5 -6 (C.A.3 (N.J.) 2009) 
(Credit card contract  that is presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis” in a standardized 
printed form where the “adhering” party has no opportunity to negotiate was a contract of 
adhesion.); In re Plourde, 397 B.R. 207, 225-26 (Bkrtcy.D.N.H., 2008).
41  In 2004, credit card issuers sent more than five billion direct mail solicitations. 
Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 Mich. L.Rev. 899, 905, 906, 908 (2006).
42  Id. at 905, 908.
43  In re Plourde, 397 B.R. 207, 225-26 (Bkrtcy.D.N.H., 2008).
44  Id.
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Research Corporation for the Consumer Federation of America in 2007.45 
The poll found that:
 
--91 percent of Americans think it is unfair to raise interest rates or 
fees at any time for any reason. (76 percent believe it is very unfair.) 
 
--83 percent of Americans think it is unfair to increase the interest 
rate on one card because of a person’s payment history on another 
card. (62 percent believe it is very unfair.) 
 
--84 percent of Americans think it is unfair to apply interest rate 
increases not only to new balances but also to past balances. (61 
percent believe it is very unfair.) 
 
--85 percent of Americans think it is unfair to increase an interest 
rate to 30 percent for making two late payments. (64 percent 
believe it is very unfair.) 
 
--76 percent of Americans think it is very unfair to charge $30 for 
making a late payment. (51 percent believe it is very unfair.) 
 
--82 percent of Americans think it is unfair to charge a $30 fee 
each month if a balance is over the credit limit when a person is no 
longer using the card. (64 percent believe it is very unfair.)46
Given the apparent attitudes of American consumers, it is clear that 
if given any meaningful opportunity to bargain for individual terms, 
consumers would not agree to penalty fees which are standard in the 
cardholder agreements of every major card issuer.
 In these contracts of adhesion, credit card companies reserve 
the right to unilaterally change the terms of the agreement at any time, 
45  Congressional Testimony by Travis B. Plunkett, Affiliated with Consumer 
Federation of America, Consumer Protection; Committee: Senate Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, Cong. Q., February 12, 2009.
46  Id.
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for any reason, and the consumer effectively accepts the terms merely 
by continuing to use the card.47 The cardholder’s only recourse to avoid 
the imposition of the new terms is to cancel his credit card.48  In its 
cardholder agreements, American Express expressly reserves the right to 
unilaterally change the terms of the agreement, including:  
 (1) the right, in its sole discretion, at any time, to increase and/
or decrease the credit line and cash advance limit; (2) the right to 
decline any attempted charge even if the charge would not cause 
the debtor to exceed its credit line or cash advance limit; (3) the 
right to unilaterally change the mathematical formulas specified 
in the credit card agreement for calculation of the finance charge if 
the formula produces mathematically similar results; (4) the right 
to exclude, in its discretion, certain debit transactions or fees from 
the calculation of the daily balance to which the finance charge 
is applied; (5) the right to suspend or cancel the account, or any 
feature offered with the account, including reducing the credit line 
to an amount below the outstanding balance in its sole discretion, at 
any time, whether or not the account is in default and without prior 
notice to the debtor; and (6) the right to add, modify or delete any 
benefit, service or feature that may accompany the account at any 
time without notice.49  
 Consumers often do not receive meaningful notice of a change in 
terms of the contract.50  “When [the credit card company] does provide 
notice, the notice typically is in the form of a new agreement included 
in a billing statement together with a variety of other promotional 
materials.”51  Most consumers routinely discard these “bill stuffers” 
without a glance.52  
47  “Current credit card agreements provide the issuer with the right to unilaterally 
alter virtually all of the material terms of the contract, and to even terminate the contract, 
in whole or in part, with no notice to the consumer.”  Id.;  See also, Mann, supra note 41 at 
905, 908 (noting that standardized contracts, like credit card agreements, are usually not 
negotiated and that credit card agreements typically “reserve[ ] to the issuer the right to 
amend ... at any time,” with such amendments being “remarkabl[y] frequen[t]”). 
48  Id.
49  Plourde, 397 B.R. at 225-26.
50  Mann, supra note 41 at 908.
51  Id.
52  Id.
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B. Current Late and Over-limit Fees are Not Reasonable Estimations of 
Damages in the Event of Breach.
 Credit card contracts invariably state that if the consumer makes 
his minimum payment after a certain time on the due date or pays less 
than his total minimum payment, the customer is assessed a “late fee.”53  
Late fees often range from $35 to $39 per occurrence in agreements with 
major card issuers.54  Some credit card agreements provide for smaller 
late fees on low balances.55  A late fee will be assessed whether the 
consumer makes the payment one minute after the cutoff time on the due 
date, three days later, or waits until the next month.
 Once the consumer misses a payment, remits his payment 
after the due date, or exceeds his credit limit, the fees assessed by the 
credit card company become a part of his minimum balance due for the 
next billing cycle, even though the fees themselves do not reflect any 
additional capital expenditure by the creditor.  Thus, if on the due date 
of the next payment the cardholder only remits his past and current 
payments due based on the principal and interest, but does not pay the 
fees, he will incur an additional late fee and an additional over-limit 
fee (if his balance still exceeds the credit limit) even though he has not 
borrowed any additional money.   Many credit card companies also 
charge over-limit fees if a late fee causes the cardholder’s balance to 
exceed the limit.56  As a result of this practice of fee-stacking, credit card 
balances may grow exponentially over time, sometimes resulting in the 
cardholder paying several times the value of the goods and services he 
charged to his credit card.57
 The credit card company’s cost to process the payment is the 
same whether the payment is made on time, a day late, or even a month 
late.  The company has absolutely no transaction cost if the payment is 
53  Gregory Karp, Study: Small Bank Card Fees Less Punitive (Sept. 8, 2008), 
http://www.gregkarp.com/blog/2008/09/09/study-small-bank-card-fees-less-punitive/.
54  For a list of penalty fees charged by various credit card companies, see Gregory 
Karp, Study: Small Bank Card Fees Less Punitive (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.gregkarp.
com/blog/2008/09/09/study-small-bank-card-fees-less-punitive/.
55  Id.
56  Plunkett, supra note 45.
57  Id.
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not made at all, because there is no transaction to process.  Therefore, the 
credit card company will not suffer any damages from processing the late 
payment.  
 Although they are not required to, some credit card companies 
may call or send a written notification to cardholders, informing 
them that their payment was not received.  In the event of a written 
notification, it would be one of many mass-produced automatically via 
a computer program which inserts the customer’s personal information 
from its existing databases, in the same manner the companies mass-
produce direct mail solicitations.  In the case of a phone call, companies 
often use automated voice recordings or perhaps a live person to make 
the collection calls.  The cost of any of these notification methods is 
negligible at best.  However, many credit card companies do not send 
any notices at all, and the charges merely appear on the cardholder’s 
next billing statement, which produces no additional cost.  Also, if the 
consumer’s payment is merely late because the credit card company 
processed the payment after the cutoff time on the due date, or before 
any reminder could be sent out, there is no additional transaction cost, 
and no late fee would be justified.
 The credit card company may argue that it suffers damages 
because it could have re-lent the consumer’s minimum payment and 
received interest on that money.  However, the credit card company 
is already accruing interest on the minimum payment—from the 
cardholder.58  When the cardholder fails to make his payment on time, 
interest is accruing on his total balance, including the unremitted 
minimum payment, whereas if the cardholder had remitted the payment, 
he would stop paying interest on that portion of his balance. Therefore, 
the credit card company would not make any more money by lending the 
amount of the minimum payment to another borrower.59  Most likely, 
the credit card company is already making the most possible interest 
58  Late fees in a mortgage contract were struck down in Oklahoma as illegal contact 
penalties
59  Most credit card agreements contain terms providing that if a cardholder makes 
one or a series of late payments, the interest rate on both new and existing balances will 
default to the maximum interest rate allowed by law, the “default rate.”  Mann, supra note 
41, at 908-09.
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on its money by lending to the cardholder.60  Other types of loans, such 
as mortgages, car loans, and student loans, usually garner much lower 
interest rates for the lenders.61  (This assumes that the lender is a bank 
which engages in other types of lending.)  If the credit card company is 
already making the most money that can be guaranteed on the amount 
of a cardholder’s minimum payment, then it stands to reason that 
the company is not losing any money, and therefore suffers no actual 
damages, if the cardholder makes a late payment. 
 Credit card companies may also argue that the late fees and 
over-limit fees compensate them for the perceived increase in risk of the 
cardholder’s nonpayment, evidenced by the fact that he failed to make 
one or more of his payments on time.  However, credit card companies 
already have a mechanism in place to compensate for the perceived 
increase in risk—they increase the cardholder’s interest rate.62  After a 
single late payment, a low interest rate may skyrocket to thirty percent 
or more.63 In some cases, a consumer may pay his credit card bill on time 
every single month for years, and he may still see his rate increase if he 
makes a late payment to a completely different and unrelated lender.64  
The rate hikes, often to the “default rate”, apply to both new and existing 
balances.65
 Furthermore, if the credit card company’s goal was for the 
cardholder to pay off his balance, it would seem counterintuitive to 
impose compounding $39 late and over-limit fees each month.  The 
accumulation of fees in addition to a regular monthly payment often 
results in a “balloon payment” for the consumer to cover the overdue 
amounts.66  These balloon payments get larger each month until the 
consumer is able to completely pay down all the overdue penalty 
60  See Sun-Times Wires, Your Wallet, Chi. Sun Times, December 19, 2008, at 42 
(citing 5.19 percent average 30-year fixed-rate mortgages).
61  Id.
62  Although credit card issuers argue that the default rate is imposed to compensate 
them for the increased risk they must bear, this seems inconsistent with the fact that card 
issuers increase the default rate at times when their cost to purchase the funds has declined. 
Plunkett, supra note 45.
63  Elizabeth Stull, Bankruptcy Filings Rising, Rochester Area ‘Fortunate,’ Daily 
Rcord (Rochester, N. Y.), Oct. 10, 2008 (page unavailable online), 2008 WLNR 19554846.
64  Id.
65  Mann, supra note 41 at 909.
66  Plunkett, supra note 45.
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fees combined with his average monthly payment. Meanwhile, since 
the consumer made a late payment, his interest rate will increase 
retroactively, making even his normal minimum payment much higher.67  
Penalty fees thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy by making it even more 
difficult for cash-strapped consumers to pay down their credit card bills, 
and thereby proving that the consumers who missed that first payment 
are “risky.”68
 Credit card companies should not receive any compensation at 
all for any perceived increase in risk the borrower may pose when he 
exceeds his credit limit, because the companies have complete control 
of whether such transactions are even approved.  If the credit card 
companies are able to deny the transactions, but choose not to do so, they 
have willingly assumed any associated risks.
C. If Credit Card Companies did Suffer Damages, They Would Not be 
Difficult to Calculate.
 Credit card late and over-limit fees also fail the Banta69 
test because credit card agreements are purely financial, and any 
projected damages from lost profits or extra transaction costs are easily 
ascertainable. To mail a late payment notification, the damages would be 
the cost of postage; if a human representative notifies the cardholder by 
phone, it would be the hourly employee’s wage for the number of minutes 
spent on the phone call.  If there is no notification, there is no transaction 
cost at all, which means that a one-size-fits-all fee is inappropriate. Since 
it is completely within the power of a credit card company to deny over-
limit transactions altogether, any additional costs incurred as a result 
of these transactions would be voluntarily assumed, and should not be 
assessed against the cardholder; if the credit card company chooses to 
permit the transaction, it will still benefit by accruing interest on that 
amount from the cardholder.
IV. Proposed Remedies
A. The Courts Giveth and the Courts Should Taketh Away.
67  Id.
68  “There is very little evidence that relatively modest problems, like one or two late 
payments of a short duration - significantly increase a consumer’s chances of default.” Id.
69  Stamford v. Banta, 92 A. 665, 667 (Conn. 1914).
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 In the 1990’s there was a public outcry protesting late fees.  
In 1995, consumers banded together in a class action lawsuit against 
Citibank, one of the major credit card issuers.70  In Sherman, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that the term “interest” in the National 
Bank Act refers only to periodic percentage rate charged on outstanding 
balances and does not include loan terms or charges such as late fees.71 
  We determine that the understanding of “interest” as expressed 
and authorized in the NBA does not include distinctive and 
contingent loan terms or charges, such as late fees, that are 
unrelated to interest rates. We hold that late-payment fees are not 
“interest” within the intendment and purposes of the applicable 
federal statute. Rather, “interest at a rate allowed by the laws of 
the State . . . where the bank is located” refers only to the periodic 
percentage rate charged on outstanding balances. Therefore, 
plaintiff’s state-law defenses to the bank’s charges do not conflict 
with federal law, are not preempted, and the late-payment fees are 
illegal under New Jersey law.72
One might easily agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court, as late 
fees, which may potentially be higher than the entire balance of a credit 
card, do not seem to even be related to the amount of money one has 
borrowed.73  Consider the following: Consumer has a credit card balance 
of $25.00.  She pays her bill on the due date, but after the cutoff time, 
incurring a late fee of $39.00.  The late fee would be 150% of her total 
balance due, and she would still have to pay an additional amount for the 
regular periodic interest as per her cardholder agreement.
 However, even if late fees were determined as a percentage of 
the cardholder’s total balance, certainly such fees were not anticipated, 
much less expressly authorized by Congress when enacting the National 
Banking Act.  Even if the late penalty was a low percentage of the card’s 
total balance, the resulting fees to cardholders would be outrageous.  
American Express is reportedly considering such a scheme: cardholders 
70  Sherman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 668 A.2d 1036 (N.J.,1995).
71  Id.
72  Id. at 1040.
73  Consider the following: Consumer has a credit card balance of $25.00.  She pays 
her bill on the due date, but after the cutoff time, incurring a late fee of $39.00. 
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would pay either $39 or 2.99% of their balance as a late penalty, 
whichever is greater.74  Under such a regime, a consumer with a $10,000 
balance would open his bill to find a $299 late fee, even though his 
minimum payment due may have only been $200. 
 Soon after New Jersey ruled that the National Banking Act’s 
authorization of charging interest did not include late fees, the United 
States Supreme Court heard a very similar California case against 
Citibank and came to the opposite conclusion, overruling Sherman.75  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that since the Comptroller of the Currency had 
“reasonably interpreted the term ‘interest’ to include late payment fees,”76 
that the Court should defer to the Comptroller, the official charged with 
administering the Act.77
 The text of the National Banking Act reads as follows:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan 
or . . . other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the 
laws of the State . . . where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per 
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial 
paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve 
district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, 
and no more, except that where by the laws of any State a different 
rate is limited for banks organized under state laws, the rate so 
limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in 
any such State under title 62 of the Revised Statutes. When no rate 
is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or District, the bank 
may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding 7 per 
centum, or 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-
day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the 
Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may 
74  Chu, supra note 2.  
75  Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996), Citibank (South 
Dakota), N.A. v. Sherman, 517 U.S. 1241 (1996).
76  Comptroller of the Currency defined the term “interest” to include “fees 
connected with credit extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not 
sufficient funds [NSF] fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership 
fees”; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a).
77  Smiley, 517 U.S. 735.
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be the greater . . . .78
By adopting the Comptroller’s skewed definition of “interest” and 
holding that the National Banking Act pre-empts state law in the area 
of consumer protection, the Supreme Court has left the states powerless 
to protect their citizens against penalty fees and other abusive lending 
practices.79  
 When one reads the plain language of the statute, one observes 
that every time the statute mentions “interest,” the term is always used 
in connection with a “rate.”    A careful reading of the statute indicates 
that the interest contemplated was a periodic percentage rate, such as 
the APRs which credit card companies are already charging consumers.  
Late fees and over-limit fees are often flat fees which are never a 
defined proportion of a consumer’s balance due, and can in no way be 
considered a “rate” of any kind.  It is hard to imagine that Congress’s 
legislative intent included allowing forty-seven states to be subject to the 
intentionally-weakened consumer protection laws of Delaware, Nebraska 
and South Dakota,80 especially considering the deeply-rooted historic 
resistance to nationalized banking.81
 The Supreme Court could effectively abolish late fees by 
overruling Smiley and adopting an interpretation of the National Banking 
Act consistent with the plain language –holding that late and over-limit 
fees are not authorized under the Act—and simultaneously finding 
that the National Banking Act’s authorization for lenders to export 
interest rates82 does not pre-empt the consumer protection laws of the 
78  12 U.S.C. § 85
79  Smiley, 517 U.S. 735.
80  Kevin G. Toh, Are Credit-Card Late Fees “Interest”? Delineating the Preemptive 
Reach of Section 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864 and Section 521 of The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1294, 1296 
(1996).
81  Sherman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 668 A.2d 1036, 1040 (N.J. 1995) 
(citing William Oscar Scroggs, A Century of Banking Progress, 50-51 (1924); John J. Knox, 
A History of Banking in the U.S., 12 (2d ed. 1969)).
82  In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the United Supreme 
Court held that under the National Banking Act, a national bank based in one state (here, 
Nebraska) could charge out-of-state consumers interest rates that were allowed by its 
home state when such a rate is greater than that allowed in the consumer’s state, thereby 
permitting “exportation” of interest rates.   Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of 
Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978).
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cardholder’s state.83  While it would still be possible for states to impose 
their own legislation which enables credit card companies to charge late 
and over-limit fees, clearly, many states—including the twenty-six states 
that joined in an amicus curiae brief in support of Barbara Smiley—would 
be more protective of their consumers.84 
 Admittedly, it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court 
will overrule its unanimous decision in Smiley85, especially given that 
the composition of the Court has not changed substantially since 1996.86  
However, perhaps after seeing the far-reaching ramifications of its 
decision, the court would be willing to reconsider its decision.87
B. Legislative Remedies
 Numerous bills have been introduced in the legislature to curb 
the abusive lending practices of credit card companies, but precious 
few even make it out of committees.  The Credit Cardholders Bill of 
Rights, which has proven to be an exception to the rule, recently passed 
in the United States House of Representatives and is currently up for 
consideration in the Senate.88  This piece of legislation, as passed by 
the House, is proposed as an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act89 
that would help even the playing field for consumers in many important 
aspects.  Victories for credit cardholders would include: the ability to 
opt-out of creditor authorization of transactions that cause a cardholder 
to exceed his credit limit where a fee would be imposed; limitation on 
the number of over-limit fees which a creditor may impose in a single 
83  For an in-depth discussion of the arguments why the National Banking Act does 
not pre-empt state consumer protection laws, see Toh, supra note 3, in its entirety. 
84  Amicus Curiae Brief of The Commonwealth Of Massachusetts And The States 
Of Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia And District Of Columbia in Support of Petitioner, 1996 WL 
88720 (Mar. 01, 1996).
85  517 U.S. 735.
86  There have only been two changes to the Court:  Justice O’Connor was replaced 
by Justice Alito in 2006, and Chief Justice Rehnquist was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts 
in 2005.
87  As an example, the late fees under consideration by the Court in Smiley were $6, 
from a card issuer based in a state with very weak consumer protection laws, and since that 
decision, standard late fees have risen to $39. 517 U.S. at 738.
88  “The Credit Cardholder’s Bill of Rights Act,” 2009 House Bill 5244, passed 312-
112 on September 23, 2008.
89  15 U.S.C.A. § 1601
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billing cycle; a prohibition on retro-active interest rate increases; and 
the requirement that cardholders be notified forty-five days in advance 
of an interest rate increase under most circumstances.90  The Credit 
Cardholders’ Bill of Rights would also prevent credit card companies 
from arbitrarily raising interest rates.91  However, the credit card 
companies would still be allowed to raise a cardholder’s interest rate if 
the minimum payment was not received within a thirty day grace period 
following the due date.92  
 However, while these long overdue amendments to the Truth 
in Lending Act93 constitute significant progress in the protection of 
consumer rights, they do not abolish, nor even limit the amount lenders 
may charge for late and over-limit fees.94  In fact, Representative 
Maloney95, the bill’s sponsor, used this as a selling-point during the 
United States House of Representatives’ hearing on the bill: “Unlike 
other proposals before Congress our bill does not set price controls, it 
does not . . . set rate caps, or limit the size of fees.”96
 Alternatively, Congress could return the power to legislate 
consumer protection laws to the states by either amending the National 
Banking Act97 or creating new legislation.  Given consumers’ intense 
dissatisfaction with the current state of creditor relations98 and the states’ 
eagerness to retain the right to legislate this important area of law under 
their police powers,99 it would seem that such an initiative would prove 
wildly popular.  Congress could accomplish this goal simply by amending 
the National Banking Act100 to expressly disclaim federal pre-emption of 
state consumer-protection laws, thereby protecting state powers while 
90  2009 H.B. 5244 (§127B(c))
91  2009 H.B. 5244 (§127B(a)(1))
92  Id. at 127B(b)(1)(C)
93  15 U.S.C.A. § 160.
94  2009 H.B. 5244.
95  Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, United States House of Representatives (D-
NY).
96  Hearing of the Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit Subcommittee of 
the House Financial Services Committee; Subject: The Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights: 
Providing New Protections for Consumers; /Capitol Hill Hearing/U.S. News Service, March 
18, 2008.
97  12 U.S.C. § 85.
98  Plunkett, supra note 46.
99  Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 77.
100  12 U.S.C. § 85.
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retaining the ability to achieve lender parity between state and federal 
lending institutions.
V. Conclusion
 Credit card late and over-limit fees are penalties, not liquidated 
damages, which are only artificially agreed upon through contracts 
of adhesion.  Congress must act decisively by amending the National 
Banking Act so that state courts would be free to prohibit penalty fees in 
their states, and courts would be able to once again prevent recovery of 
these contract penalties.
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